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Abstract
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) skyrocketing demand for oil has become a
global issue of marked significance in the fields of international relations and energy economics.
One topic receiving attention from experts and policymakers in both disciplines is China’s
ongoing development of strategic petroleum stockpiles. That China should and will stockpile oil
is certain, but what sort of system China should employ remains unclear. To provide insight into
the questions and challenges that face the PRC’s efforts to develop strategic petroleum reserves,
this paper will summarize the present status of China’s stockpiling plans, describe the existing
stockpiling models employed by Japan, Korea and the United States, and examine the
motivations underlying various stockpiling strategies. Finally, I will propose a model based on
this paper’s analysis for the affordable and effective completion of China’s strategic oil reserve.
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1.1 Introduction: China and Energy Security in the 21st Century
Today, few issues loom larger in the realm of international relations than the competition
for the world’s dwindling supply of oil. At the same time, the People’s Republic of China’s
transition from third world economy to global superpower constitutes the greatest challenge to
the post-Cold War world order. If America’s rise to global hegemonic power was the story of the
20th century, China’s similar emergence may be the story of the 21st. So it is not surprising that
China’s energy security—the confluence of these two issues of immeasurable global import—is
garnering more and more international attention.
China’s role in the global oil market has only recently become a subject of international
concern. China’s economic reform began in 1978, but not until the PRC’s accession to the World
Trade Organization in 2001 did Western apprehension of China’s rise begin to approach today’s
fervent pitch. Producing more oil domestically than Venezuela, Iraq or Kuwait, China did not
become a net importer of oil until 1993 (see figure 1). China’s oil consumption passed Japan’s in
2002; today, only the United States consumes more oil than the PRC. Then, in 2004, China’s oil
imports increased by an unprecedented 49 percent, contributing to a 33 percent jump in global oil
prices. By some calculations, China has accounted for about 40% of incremental world oil
demand in the past 5 years.1

1

BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005.
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Figure 1: China Crude Production and Net Oil Import Requirements (1990-2015)2
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
kb/d

0

(1,000)
(2,000)
(3,000)
(4,000)
(5,000)
1990

1995

1998

1999

Crude Production
2

2000

2001

2002

2003

2005

2010

2015

Net Oil Import Requirements

Turmoil in Venezuela, Iraq and Iran, natural disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and continued strong

global oil demand growth have led to record nominal crude oil prices in the second quarter of
2006. High prices have focused attention to the geopolitical oil situation and, unsurprisingly,
China.
1.2 Distinctive Characteristics of the Oil Market
Oil consumers, producers and traders buy and sell oil on global commodities markets,
and crude oil behaves much like other commodities such as steel, timber and diamonds. However,
oil is the world’s most strategic resource. Its scarcity and its centrality to the world economy
prevent it from adhering to the rules of market economics. The term “energy security” refers
almost exclusively to oil, and within that context, mostly to the supply of oil imports; other
sources of energy, including nuclear, hydroelectric, and coal, are relevant to energy security only
in that they constitute opportunities to become less dependent less on oil. Many oil majors, such
as Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest company, are state-owned; these firms tend to prioritize

2

FACTS Inc, “China Multi-Client Study,” 2002.
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government policy above profitability. All of China’s significant oil companies fall into this
category.
The irregularity of the oil market extends beyond state control of oil companies.
Governments frequently meddle in demand side oil economics. Around the world, oil is heavily
taxed and subsidized. Domestic price controls in large markets including China and India remain
obstacles to oil market liberalization.
Intense politicization also affects the behavior of the global oil outlook. The vast majority
of the world’s proven oil reserves3 lie in the Middle East, North Africa, South America and
central Asia; today, these areas are rent by political and ethnic strife.
Figure 2: Distribution of Proved Oil Reserves 1984,1994, 20044

The United States accounts for roughly one fourth of global oil consumption, and the
quest for energy security exerts a significant influence on United States foreign policy. As the
world’s largest consumer, largest importer and third largest producer of oil, the United States is
3

Note that “reserve” here refers to oil in the ground available for future production. In the context of this paper’s
topic, “reserve” is also frequently used as a synonym of “stockpile,” as in “United States Strategic Petroleum
Reserve;” in this usage, the term refers to produced oil stored in tanks, salt caverns and so on.
4
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005.

Nieh 8
the most dominant and most concerned player in the world oil market. Around the world, oil is
exclusively traded in US dollars.5
Disparate evaluations of the future of petroleum further complicate the oil market. As
figure 2 indicates, the world’s total proven oil reserves, in spite of being consumed at a rate of
roughly 80 mb/d, continue to increase with exploration. But whether or not exploration and
production can keep up with consumption remains a point of contention. Recent treatises such as
“Out of Gas” and “The Empty Tank” contend that oil production will soon peak, with potential
consequences ranging from global economic recession to large-scale military resource
competition.6 Pessimistic “peak oil” predictions have been made throughout the history of the oil
industry; to date, obviously, none have proven accurate. More mainstream projections forecast a
leveling off of oil production in the next 10 to 20 years as new projects struggle to replace
dwindling productivity in the world’s super-giant fields: Ghawar in Saudi Arabia, the North Sea
and so on.7 Still others, most notably the International Energy Agency, have forecast that new
production will continue to meet demand; in the IEA’s World Energy Outlook, the organization
projects that in 2030, the world will comfortably be consuming 120 mb/d.8 The development of
superior recovery technology (e.g. gas-to-liquids technology) and the increasing commercial
practicability of alternative oil sources (e.g. Canada’s shale oil and tar sands) further obfuscate
projections of oil’s future.
Also complicating matters of projection is the interested nature of most relevant
projectors. The estimates of China’s oil demand in table 2 demonstrate how much forecasts vary
from source to source. Many projectors are cogs in the oil business or oil-producing country’s

5

Petrov, Krassimir. Countercurrents.org, “The Proposed Iranian Oil Bourse,” 01.20.2006 <
http://www.countercurrents.org/us-petrov200106.htm>
6
“Steady as She Goes,” The Economist, 04.20.2006.
7
Interviews, Honolulu, July 2005.
8
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2002.
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governments with a vested stake in oil’s continued dominance of the world energy trade; others
are environmentalists who a priori oppose the use of oil and eagerly anticipate its demise; still
others are talking heads and public intellectuals on the watch for a catchy book title. Estimates of
oil reserves generally come from the governments that possess them, leaving plenty of
opportunity and motivation for number-fudging: A leaked Kuwaiti government paper suggesting
that the small oil producing state’s reserves had been overstated twofold recently roiled the
industry.9
Table 1: Projections of China’s Oil Demand (mb/d)10

The relationship between the price of oil and its supply and demand is less concrete than
often assumed. The most commonly discussed oil price is that of the one month forward contract
for a barrel of West Texas Intermediate crude on the New York Mercantile Exchange. These
contracts are bought and sold on a large scale by commodities traders, and not necessarily by the
actual producers and consumers of oil. Simply put, the price of oil is greatly speculative.

9

“Steady as She Goes,” The Economist, 04.20.2006.
Downs, Erica Stricker. “China’s Energy Security,” January 2004. IEA Figures from World Energy Outlook 2002,
p. 92; US Energy Information Agency figures from International Energy Outlook 2003, p185; APERC figures from
APEC 2002, p. 57; Energy Research Institute, State Development Planning Commission (ERI/SDPC) figures from
Gao Shixian, “China,” in Paul b. Stares, ed., Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia (Tokyo: Japan Center for
International Exchange, 2000), pp. 46; PRC Industry figures from Yang Qing, “Zhongguo shiyou wenti de zhanlüe
diwei fenxi,” Zhongguo shiyou, 1 January 2002, China Infobank; PRC Media figures from “Zhongguo de shiyou
ziyuan shiyou xuqiu he shiyou anquan,” Zhongguo chanjing xinwen, 10 July 2002, China Infobank.
10
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According to one industry expert, the present oil price includes a “fear premium” of up to $30
above the price that market fundamentals support. Anxiety about the possibility of supply
disruptions, magnified by the market’s sparse spare capacity, accounts for this “fear premium.”11
The oil world is unique and uniquely complicated, and all its different players have their
own versions of the facts and the future. It is within the framework of these conditions that China
formulates its own energy security policy.
1.3 Equity Oil: the Chinese Energy Dilemma
The Chinese oil debate centers on a tug of war between two different outlooks within the
realm of international political economy: economic liberalism and economic nationalism. The
former emphasizes the utility of international trade in increasing general welfare through the
exploitation of comparative advantages. It is the worldview of free market capitalism. The latter
posits trade in the context of the maximization of national power, emphasizing self-sufficiency
and relative rather than absolute welfare. Economic liberalism suggests a separation between the
spheres of politics and economics; economic nationalism insists that politics ultimately drive
economics. The ultimate conclusion of economic nationalism is autarky.12
Today, China is in the midst of a massive transition from the extreme economic
nationalism of the Maoist era to an economic liberalist market capitalism. As the government
deregulates industries and privatizes state-owned enterprises, China’s economy functions more
and more independently of its political system. However, China’s oil industry remains dominated
by economic nationalism. As noted above, all of China’s major oil companies are state-owned,
and the government continues to regulate petroleum product prices. Most importantly, economic
nationalism continues to influence China’s search for a steady supply of oil.

11
12

Lauerman, Vincent. “The Fear Premium in the World Oil Market,” Geopolitics of Energy July 2005.
Downs, Erica Stricker. “China’s Energy Security,” January 2004, p. 23.
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In the past decade, China has pursued a neo-mercantilist oil security policy often called
“equity oil.” Rather than purchase oil through the conventional avenues of international
exchange, the PRC has instead guided its state-owned oil companies to purchase oil equity
abroad, generally in the form of shared exploration and production rights. The consensus among
industry experts is that China overpays for these acquisitions in exchange for a perceived greater
oil supply security. “This obsession with equity oil is most likely due to a poor understanding of
oil markets … and to the belief that in a crisis situation, Chinese oil companies will be more
concerned about meeting China’s energy needs than foreign oil companies,” suggests one
Brookings Institute China expert.13
Indeed, the equity oil approach relies heavily on the notion that as global oil supplies
tighten, Chinese stakes in oil projects abroad will ensure a steady supply. This demonstrates a
Chinese lack of faith in the economic liberalist view of the oil market, in which the sole criterion
of oil access is the capacity to buy it. In many ways, these approaches act as self-fulfilling
prophecies; if the Chinese government requires Chinese oil importers to make financially
unjustifiable acquisitions and sell to the Chinese market at a loss, the liquidity of the global oil
market will correspondingly decrease.
The equity oil approach has tarnished China’s image abroad, damaging any illusion of
separation between the government and China’s major oil companies. For example, the US
Congress’s uproar over the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company’s bid for Unocal arose
mainly due to the Chinese government’s control over CNOOC. China has also engaged in
strategic bilateral consumer-producer relationships, offering political accommodations in hopes
of securing access to oil. China’s partnerships with Iran and Sudan in particular have raised

13

Downs, Erica Stricker. “China’s Energy Security,” January 2004, p. 137.
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hackles in the West, and some hawkish commentators have even warned of potential weaponsfor-oil relationships between China and Middle Eastern pariah states.
Through its equity oil approach, China has positioned itself for competition, rather than
cooperation, with the rest of the oil-consuming world. If and how China applies this approach to
its development of oil stockpiles will crucially influence their success.
1.4 The Basics of Oil Stockpiling
The world’s first strategic oil stockpiles appeared in oil-importing states in the aftermath
of the OPEC embargo of the early 1970s. The primary purpose of such stockpiles is the
amelioration of oil supply disruptions—like the one caused by the embargo. Supply disruptions
could take the form of international political conflict, natural disaster, technical malfunction and
so on. Therefore, a supply disruption could affect either the domestic or the international oil
supplies of a given oil-consuming state. However, due to the volatile nature of the global oil
trade, import substitution remains the primary contingency of strategic oil stockpiles; thus, only
net oil importing states maintain significant strategic oil reserves.
Oil reserves are measured both in barrels of oil and also days of forward cover; however,
this measurement of preparation can be deceiving. For example, the US Strategic Petroleum
Reserve’s 700 million barrels of oil provides less than 35 days of forward cover, given the US’
consumption of over 20 mb/d. However, the SPR could completely replace the US’ imports of
oil from the Middle East—less than 2 mb/d—for roughly a year. This figure is unquestionably
more relevant.
Presently, the world’s oil-importing countries are maintaining roughly 1.4 billion barrels
of strategically stockpiled oil. Non-strategic oil stockpiles—that is, commercial oil stockpiles—
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maintained by oil companies amount to another 2.7 billion barrels of oil currently held in
reserve.14
The IEA, also formed in the early 70s, serves as an international energy policy organizer
for 26 OECD member states. Centered in Paris, the agency advises stockpiling policy globally,
and all states with significant stockpiles are IEA members. The IEA’s past coordination of
stockpile releases in emergency oil scenarios, as well as the relevant characteristics of the major
oil stockpiling systems, will be discussed later in this paper.

14

“Fact Sheet on IEA Oil Stocks and Emergency Response Potential,” International Energy Agency, 04.14.2006
<http://www.iea.org/Textbase/Papers/2004/factsheetcover.pdf>
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2.1 The Current Status of China’s Stockpiling Plans
High-level discussion of the need for strategic oil stockpiles began after China became a
net importer of oil in 1993. The Tenth Five-Year Plan, passed in 2001 by the Fourth Plenum of
the Ninth National People’s Congress, named the development of strategic stockpiles a primary
goal. Construction of the first storage sites did not begin until after the Chinese leadership
transition in 2003, allegedly because some senior officials, including former premier Zhu Rongji,
objected to the expensive nature of the stockpiling plans.15
Presently, construction of tanks for the storage of crude oil is underway at four sites
designated as the first phase of the stockpiling plan: Zhenhai and Aoshan in Zhejiang province,
Huangdao in Shandong province and Dalian in Liaoning province. Zhenhai and Aoshan will
eventually store roughly 5,000,000 cu m (31,400,000 bbls) crude oil each, while the Huangdao
and Dalian sites will be smaller at 3,000,000 cu m (18,900,000 bbls) apiece. Therefore, the first
phase of China’s stockpiling plans, which the government seeks to complete by the end of 2008,
will include roughly 16,000,000 cu m of crude oil: more than 100,000,000 barrels.
Construction of 16 of the 52 tanks planned for the Zhenhai facility, each with 100,000 cu
m of crude oil capacity, was completed at the end of August 2005. The state-run Chinese media
announced in June 2005 that the government would begin to fill the tanks later that year.16 To
date, the tanks remain unfilled. In light of tightness in the world oil market and unprecedented
nominal crude prices, how and when the government will purchase crude for the Zhenhai facility
remains unclear. Zhang Guobao, vice-minister of the National Development and Reform
Commission, told the state-run Xinhua news agency that domestically produced crude would be

15

Ibid p. 164
“China to Fill Petroleum Reserves this Year,” Xinhua News, 06.24.2005
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/24/content_3128762.htm>
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used to fill the Zhenhai tanks, preventing increased pressure on the international market.17
Zhang’s comments do not make sense from an oil economics perspective; use of domestic crude
to fill the tanks would still affect the market by increasing Chinese import demand. Moreover,
domestic crude may not be the optimal stockpiling option (as discussed below).
Chinese officials and experts admit that no final decisions have been made about how to
fill the reserve.18 Oil prices have remained high into the spring of 2006, and no plans to fill the
completed Zhenhai storage space have been announced.
Sinopec oversees construction at the Zhenhai facility, which neighbors the massive
Sinopec Zhenhai Refinery. Sinopec is also responsible for construction at the Huangdao site;
PetroChina and Sinochem are building the Dalian and Aoshan sites respectively. But China’s
state oil companies will not manage the petroleum reserves. That role will fall to the nascent
State Oil Stockpiling Office and State Oil Stockpiling Center, established under the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The nature and structure of these organizations
remain ambiguous.
Various sources within the PRC have revealed glimpses of China’s future stockpiling
plans. A potential second phase, resembling the first, has already been tentatively sited. Phase
two plans for an additional 89 million barrels of overground tank storage, originally slated for
completion by 2010.19 An Fengquan, a senior engineer at Sinopec’s Economics and
Development Research Institute, suggested that the government may require China’s oil
importing companies to hold government-mandated oil stocks, imitating Japan’s stockpiling
system (outlined below).An also articulated China’s hopes to meet the IEA’s requirement of 90
17

“New Strategic Reserve to See Oil by Year’s End” Xinhua News, 07.05.2005
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-07/05/content_3175606.htm>
18
Interviews, Beijing, July 2005 and “China to have Strategic Oil Reserve Soon,” Dalian News, 06.13.2005
<http://english.runsky.com/homepage/english/news/biz/userobject1ai563039.html>
19
“China to Build Oil Reserve in Stages to Limit Effect on Prices,” Bloomberg News, 12.13.2005
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=amWykbFER1n4&refer=asia>

Nieh 16
days of forward cover, even though the PRC is not an IEA member: this goal may be issue of
image for the Chinese government. Changing conditions in the global oil market and conflicting
conceptions of the reserve’s ultimate utility within the PRC establishment have led to uncertainty
about China’s long-term stockpiling plans. In searching for the best way to build, fill and manage
its strategic petroleum reserve, China will look to the established reserve policies of other major
oil importers; an examination of existing stockpiling models shows some of the approaches that
China is considering.
2.2 Existing Petroleum Stockpiling Models: The United States
The United States government operates the largest public petroleum stockpile in the
world: The United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Established in 1975 under the Energy
Policy and Conversation Act in response to the 1970s OPEC oil embargo, the SPR provides an
efficient and conservative oil stockpiling model. Presently, the SPR holds about 700 million
barrels of oil at four storage sites located in Texas and Louisiana. Salt domes, a geological
feature that allows for cheap and efficient oil storage, dot the Gulf Coast. These salt caverns hold
the entire SPR, facilitating large scale storage, rapid drawdown capability and minimal
maintenance costs compared with other modes of storage.
The US Department of Energy operates the SPR and fills it via the “royalty in kind”
program devised by the Clinton administration in 1999. Through this program, the DOE
Minerals Management Service collects royalties in oil form from oil companies operating under
government off-shore leases in the Gulf of Mexico, and uses this oil to fill the SPR. Prior to 1999,
MMS collected royalties in cash.
At the time of President George W. Bush’s inauguration in 2001, the SPR held under 600
million barrels of oil. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush
instructed the DOE to fill the SPR to 700 million barrels, close to its capacity of roughly 730
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million barrels. The comprehensive energy bill passed by the US congress in July 2005 calls for
the expansion of the SPR to 1 billion barrels – as long as purchases of oil for the reserves do not
raise oil or oil product prices.
As the world’s leading importer of crude oil (nearly 11 mb/d) and as the world’s
dominant economic and military power, the US governs its oil stockpiles conservatively.
Government policy dictates that oil from the reserve can be released only at the order of the
president and only in an oil supply disruption scenario.
The issue of reserve release policy is not without controversy. In 1996, President Clinton
allowed the sale of 28.1 million barrels from the SPR to raise federal revenue. Prior to the 2004
election, Democratic presidential hopeful John Kerry advocated greater flexibility in managing
American oil reserves. Many conservatives, including President George W. Bush, see releasing
oil from the reserve as a strategic measure to fall upon only in the case of a supply disruption
emergency and not as a tool of economic policy.
The US SPR has been accessed for emergency drawdown only twice in its 31-year
history. The first emergency drawdown, in 1991, came in response to oil market anxiety created
by the Persian Gulf War. The mere announcement of President George H. Bush’s plans to
release oil brought a degree of stability to market prices. The IEA, which serves as the main
supranational entity coordinating energy information and policy among developed countries,
issued a coordinated emergency response plan that mandated a global drawdown of strategic oil
reserves in all 20 member states in cooperation with the US release.
The massive damage caused to Gulf of Mexico oil production, terminals, pipelines and
refineries by Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005 led to the second emergency drawdown of
the US SPR. In this release, also part of an IEA-coordinated response, the DOE made 30 million
barrels of SPR oil available for sale, 11 million of which were purchased. In addition to the
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emergency sale of 11 million barrels, the DOE approved the loan of 9.8 million barrels of SPR
crude to refiners in Katrina’s immediate aftermath. The refiners will repay these “emergency oil
loans” in kind; the US SPR will receive 10.3 million barrels of oil in compensation.20
Other past SPR releases include a handful of test sales, exchange arrangements with
private companies, and limited exchanges to smooth supply disruptions caused by Hurricanes
Lili (2002), Ivan (2004).
2.3 Existing Petroleum Stockpiling Models: Japan
The most expensive and comprehensive system of strategic oil stockpiling belongs to the
Japanese. Japan imports more oil than any other country aside from the US, and unlike both the
US and China, Japan produces no oil domestically. Versatility in some aspects and rigidity in
others characterizes the Japanese system of petroleum stockpiling, which is divided into two sets
of reserves: public and private. Roughly 310 million barrels crude, managed by the Japan Oil,
Gas and Metals National Corporation under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
comprise the government managed component of the strategic oil reserve. The ideas and
guidelines that govern these stockpiles are similar to those applied to the US SPR, but Japan is
not geologically blessed with salt caverns and has instead invested heavily in diverse methods of
oil storage. JOGMEC provides information for 10 national stockpiling bases accounting for
roughly 215 million barrels of oil, including 112 million barrels in above-ground tanks; 51
million barrels in floating tanks; 30 million barrels in rock caverns; and 22 million barrels in
underground tanks. Above-ground tanks and rock cavern storage both represent financially
reasonable alternatives in the absence of salt caverns; the vastly more expensive underground
and floating tanks demonstrate Japan’s efforts to protect its reserves from natural disasters. These

20

“Releasing Crude From the Strategic Petroleum Reserve,” US Department of Energy, 03.01.06
<http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/reserves/spr/spr-drawdown.html#katrina_sale>
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seemingly exorbitant measures make sense in light of the island state’s susceptibility to
earthquakes and typhoons.
The second set of Japan’s strategic stockpiles takes the form of government mandated
private storage. Private Japanese oil companies and importers of refined products must maintain
stocks equivalent to 70 days of consumption. According to JOGMEC, private stocks amount to
nearly 275 million barrels of oil, or 82 days of forward cover. Crude oil composes about half of
the private stocks; oil products make up the balance. This requirement is subsidized by the
Japanese government, but still constitutes a significant burden on Japanese oil companies and a
formidable barrier to entry into the Japanese oil market.
The Japanese government maintains a level of rigidity surpassing that of the US when it
comes to drawdown policy. Like the US, the Japanese subscribe to the IEA policy that relegates
strategic stockpile releases to emergency scenarios, and the Persian Gulf War is the only incident
that saw Japan release strategic oil. Japan’s nearly 600 million barrels are the only oil reserve in
the world that approaches the size of the SPR, and Japan consumes less than a fourth and imports
less than half as much oil as the US. Therefore, Japan’s system provides quite extensive
protection against supply disruption, but represents an unparalleled fiscal expenditure.
In marked contrast to the situations in China and the US, Japan’s oil demand is shrinking.
This trend simultaneously decreases Japan’s reliance on imports and improves the security
afforded by Japan’s reserves.
After a recent internal evaluation of its stockpiling practices, Japan has planned measures
to increase the “strength, flexibility and readiness” of its reserves, including a reduction of the
private company stockpiling requirement from 70 to 60 or 65 days.21

21

Hakozaki, Keiichi. “APEC Best Practices and Oil Stockpiling in Japan,” EWC APEC Stockpiling Workshop, July
2005.

Nieh 20
2.4 Existing Petroleum Stockpiling Models: South Korea
The South Korean strategic stockpiling model represents a departure from the rigid
stockpiling practices of Japan and the United States. Under government auspices, the Korean
National Oil Company (KNOC) maintains about 63 million barrels of crude oil, 7.3 million
barrels of petroleum products, and 3.6 million barrels of liquid petroleum gas (LPG). About 80%
of these stocks are stored in rock caverns; aboveground tanks house the remainder. KNOC
ambitiously plans to increase the public stockpile to 140 million barrels by 2008. Current
stockpiling bases have the capacity to store about 114 million barrels. Private Korean oil
companies must maintain 40 days of forward coverage for domestic sales, which amounts to 72
million barrels of oil today.
KNOC manages the Korean public oil stockpiles with flexibility in order to recoup some
of the expense associated with building and maintaining stocks. The company occasionally
conducts “time swaps,” which entail taking advantage of fluctuating oil prices by lending out oil
from the national stockpiles. In one such “time swap,” KNOC invites Korean refiners and
sometimes international oil purchasers to bid on a quantity of stockpiled oil. The winning bidder
must return the oil within a stipulated time period and pay the bid premium. This way, the
KNOC can offset costs, keep the stockpiled oil in circulation and maintain a balance of stocks
that reflects the present state of Korean consumption. While these measures do not make
strategic stockpiling commercially viable, they do alleviate the fiscal burden of developing and
maintaining strategic oil reserves.
KNOC also rents its spare storage capacity to foreign oil companies. Statoil, the
Norwegian independent oil company, stores over 11 million barrels in KNOC’s facilities under
this so-called “Joint Oil Stockpiling” program. KNOC developed this program to continue
increasing oil stocks under the conditions of the Asian financial crisis of 1998. The program
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provides moderate revenue in the form of rental fees and dictates that in the event of a supply
crisis Korea would enjoy a preferred right to purchase Statoil’s stored stocks at market prices.
KNOC spends the money saved from joint oil stockpiling and time swaps on expansion
of the reserve. Korea, an IEA member like Japan and the USA, occasionally comes under
criticism for the cost-offsetting measures it employs in its stockpiling strategy. But KNOC’s
innovative system has broadened the concept of strategic oil stockpiling by showing that
stockpiled oil need not be “dead” oil.
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3.1 The Key Characteristics of Strategic Oil Stockpiles
All oil stockpiling systems share the same straightforward goals: increasing oil supply
security and minimizing the effects of supply disruptions. However, the above descriptions
reveal that the world’s first, second and fourth ranked importers of oil have employed dissimilar
oil stockpiling strategies. The characteristics relevant to this discussion include cost of
development, forward cover protection, drawdown policy and economic efficiency.
Table 2: Stockpiling System Characteristics and Key Indicators

Cost of Development
Size (days of forward cover)
Drawdown Policy Flexibility
Economic Efficiency

Japan
High
High
Low
Low

USA
Medium
Low
Medium
Medium

Korea
Medium
Medium
High
High

China
?
?
?
?

2004 Net Oil Imports (million
22
bbl/d)
2004 Increase in Oil Consumption

5.1
-3.00%

11.9
2.80%

2.3
-0.80%

3.0
15.80%

This view of stockpiling strategies depicts the tradeoffs between security and efficiency, with
Japan at one end of the spectrum, Korea at the other end, and the United States in the middle.
Such delineation must be contextualized; the USA’s stockpile is the largest, but high American
demand means that the SPR provides the fewest days of forward cover. Japan’s high cost of
development is partially attributable to pronounced vulnerability to natural disasters as well as
the unavailability of salt caverns. Nonetheless, the trends apparent in Table 2 shed light on the
contrasting motivations that underlie each stockpiling system.
3.2 Discussion of the Effectiveness of Stockpiling Models
Strategic oil stockpiling, like many energy issues, represents a confluence of geopolitical
and economic interests. How these interests play out in the development of stockpiles is no
mystery: a conservative, security-based approach is manifest in the Japanese system, while the
22
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Korean national reserves spring from a more market-oriented, economically liberal philosophy.
The US system is efficient and slightly more flexible than the Japanese, but still represents a US
strategic measure and not an economic tool; many American conservatives insist on referring to
SPR drawdown scenarios as matters of national security.
None of the three systems represents an extreme. Despite KNOC’s cost-saving measures,
the oil stockpiles do not approach independent commercial solubility. And although the massive
Japanese reserves are hardly ever accessed, their mere existence inspires national and global
confidence in the oil market.
But ultimately, the differences in cost between the philosophies are readily identifiable,
and they are not trivial. The Korean approach constitutes a smaller burden on both the Korean
government and the global oil market. On the other hand, the argument for the security-based
approach lacks support. No evidence indicates that, in the situation of a global supply disruption,
the Korean system would underperform its Japanese and American counterparts. On the contrary,
the relatively frequent exercise of KNOC’s drawdown and bidding procedures would likely
facilitate smooth operation in a crisis scenario.

[This comparison is the key to your thesis:

must expand]
This thread of analysis indicates the evident superiority of the Korean stockpiling system,
but some experts and policymakers in China and elsewhere disagree. A JOGMEC official
explaining the abovementioned plans to change the Japanese system praised the greater
efficiency of the US SPR but did not mention the Korea model.23 The IEA, which forbids the use
of strategic oil reserves for “price control,” frowns upon KNOC’s time swaps. An Fengquan, the
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Sinopec engineer, expressed his doubts about Korea’s arrangement with Statoil, asking: “What if
there’s an emergency, and the oil is not there?”24
3.3 The Geopolitical Challenges of China’s Oil Stockpiling Plan
How China decides to build strategic oil stockpiles will not only carry significant
economic repercussions for the PRC but also affect the world oil market and China’s role on the
world stage. The opportunity to cooperate with other states in developing and maintaining energy
security policies could permit China to improve its reputation as a positive player in international
politics. Alternatively, a rigid and unilateral stockpiling regime in the spirit of “equity oil” would
decrease the fluidity of the oil market and hamper China’s charm offensive on the West.
As China’s import requirements continue to rise, stockpiling oil poses two challenges;
first, keeping up with growing import dependency; and second, avoiding demand inflation
caused by the import of oil for stockpiling. China’s growing demand for oil fuels anxiety about
China’s economic and military rise in the US and elsewhere; while few dispute the desirability of
a Chinese oil reserve, filling China’s tanks will unquestionably increase the strain on the world
oil market. Senior Chinese policy makers are very conscious of China’s image abroad and
therefore reluctant to augment the PRC’s already undesirable oil import demand growth. Filling
China’s petroleum reserves could add up to 100,000 b/d to Chinese import demand for years to
come. “China’s strategic reserve has met some difficulty,” said Han Wenke, deputy director of
the Energy Research Institute, a Beijing-based government think-tank. “You don’t want to have
too much of a market impact when prices are this high.”25 This reluctance to inflate demand,
along with the costs associated with purchasing oil for the reserve at today’s record crude oil
prices, is preventing the Chinese government from filling the already completed tanks at Zhenhai.
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In many ways, these choices are paradigmatic of the conundrum of China’s rise. Will
China evolve into a powerful but benign stakeholder in a multilateral world order? Or will the
world’s most populous nation become a strategic and economic competitor with the United
States and its allies? Ultimately, the decision between economic liberalism and economic
nationalism will factor heavily into the outcome of China’s global emergence. How China
chooses to stockpile oil will be a telling sign of China’s direction.
It should be noted that a conservative approach to the development of stockpiles would
not constitute preparation for military competition with the United States. In the event of military
confrontation, the American military could handily destroy China’s stockpiling facilities at their
vulnerable locations on the Eastern seaboard. A conservative stockpiling model would indicate
Chinese anticipation of Cold War-like tension, not military conflict, with the United States.
4.1 Conclusion: A Flexible Approach to the Future of China’s Strategic Oil Stockpiles
With nominal oil prices at unprecedented highs, and with a global spotlight trained on
China’s oil demand, there is little room for error in the PRC’s development of oil stockpiles. At
the moment, sentiment in China favors the Japanese model, even as Japan plans to reform its
system.26 Imitating the Japanese system would be a mistake. China would be better off
developing a flexible system suited to the unique economic, political and strategic conditions in
the PRC.
This paper finds no problem with the first phase of China’s stockpiling plan. The 100
million barrels stowed near import terminals and refineries will form the foundation of China’s
strategic reserve. However, filling these tanks with domestic oil does not make sense. Barring
draconian domestic oil rationing, any domestic oil used to fill the barrels would require
replacement by import, ultimately having the same effect on the global oil market. Furthermore,
26
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China is stockpiling oil to replace imports in supply disruption scenarios. The reserve should be
filled with the same imported oil that it is intended to back up.
Today, 100 million barrels represents around 40 days of forward cover for China. By the
time the first phase of reserves is completed, that number may have dropped to below 25 days. In
order to keep up with increasing imports, China should expand its government reserves to
maintain at least 50 days of forward cover—market conditions permitting. If, as projected, crude
oil prices remain high, the cost of these stocks per barrel will far exceed the money spent in the
past by Japan, Korea and the US in the development of their reserves. The $27/bbl cost of the US
SPR was once considered expensive, but China may pay more than twice that price. In 2004, a
“top energy planner” suggested that Beijing would not pay more than $40/bbl to fill the reserves;
today, that goal seems unattainable.27 These factors suggest that, despite China’s mammoth
foreign currency reserves, building oil stockpiles as expansive and inflexible as Japan’s or the
US’ could be prohibitively expensive. Instead, China should invest in a comfortable cushion of
government stocks, and supplement them with more innovative measures.
The unusual relationship between China’s government and its major oil companies could
play to China’s advantage in developing oil stockpiles. The US and IEA oppose private strategic
reserves because they fear that, in an emergency scenario, profit-maximizing companies may not
share their government’s interest in protecting the domestic economy. In the words of one US
DOE official, major US oil companies, if asked to maintain strategic stockpiles, “would tell us to
drop dead.”28
Chinese oil companies are different. The state-owned Chinese oil majors answer to
Beijing, an allegiance trumping any conflict of interest in a supply disruption scenario. China
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could take advantage of these companies’ existing commercial storage capacity by requiring
them to hold 40 days of forward cover in a mix of crude oil and refined products, thereby
achieving the goal of the IEA-mandated 90 days. These reserves, already in the hands of
distributors, would serve as China’s first line of defense. The Strategic Oil Stockpiles Office
could exercise flexibility in managing the “private” stocks, imitating KNOC by permitting
companies to swap oil and take advantage of seasonal price fluctuations.
Other creative stockpiling strategies could complement China’s reserves. The Korean
Joint Oil Stockpiling program is one example. Two American experts recently put forth an
alternative strategy they call “forward commercial storage,” urging OPEC producers to store
spare-capacity oil in consuming regions (e.g. East Asia) for release in tight supply scenarios.29
During his visit to Saudi Arabia in April, Chinese President Hu Jintao discussed the development
of this kind of forward storage arrangement with King Abdullah.30 China has established several
direct producer-consumer relationships; the foundation for special stockpiling measures has
already been laid.
The opportunity to cooperate with other states in developing reserves and drawdown
policies is an avenue through which China can improve its standing as a regional leader by
pursuing a multilateral approach. Proposals for regional joint stockpiling programs have received
some attention at ASEAN, ASEAN + 3 and APEC meetings. In January, India’s energy minister
expressed support for the creation of an Asian counterpart to the IEA which could “coordinate
the long-term energy import policies of major oil importers in the region.”31 And although China
is not a member of the OECD, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has recently
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expressed the United States’ interest in linking the Chinese reserve system to the 4.1 billion
barrels of petroleum reserves coordinated by the IEA.32
Innovative, cooperative measures that could save costs for the PRC abound, but
ultimately, the future of China’s strategic stockpiling system depends on the mindset of the
relevant PRC decision makers. Conservative, security-based thinking will lead to greater costs
for the government, more stress on the world oil market, and negative consequences for the
PRC’s image abroad. A more open-minded approach will facilitate the efficient and
comparatively inexpensive completion of the reserves. If Beijing is willing, the potential exists
for the development of a strong, flexible and affordable strategic oil stockpiling system.
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